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Immigrants tend to have a much higher  self-employment rate than natives. This has
been documented, for example, by Borjas (1986) and Yuengert (1995). Borjas (1999) provides
evidence that immigrants do not perform as well on the labor market as natives with similar
characteristics. This suggests two different possibilities why immigrants are more likely to choose
self-employment: Immigrants have more often characteristics that prompt self-employment
compared to natives, or immigrants meet barriers on the labor market that force them to choose
self-employment.
The central question examined in this paper is whether some immigrants use self-employment
as a last resort. We embed immigrants using self-employment as a last resort into a type of
immigrants denoted self-employed marginalized. They are self-employed without real economic
prospects, and on average they would have been better off as wage-employees. Others have found
evidence that can be interpreted as evidence for existence of self-employed marginalized
immigrants. From interviews with 232 Danish immigrants from non-Western countries, Schultz-
Nielsen (2001) found that 18% became self-employed because they were unable to get a job, and
she reports even higher numbers for Sweden. 
To examine the existence of self-employed marginalized, we propose a method based on
transition probabilities between labor market states. To identify a self-employed marginalized,
it is necessary to consider all three labor market states: self-employment, wage-employment and
non-employment. Only few studies are based on both transitions into and out of self-employment,
and among these focus has been on the choice between self-employment and wage-employment
only (Le 1999).  By including the state non–employment we do not ignore that immigrants may
have transitions to non-employment as well.
When using transition probabilities to identify self-employed marginalized, it is crucial to
control for other relevant explanations of self-employment. In particular, we allow for effects
found in the literature to matter for choosing self-employment. One effect is that immigrants may
use self-employment as a 
 
 (Light 1984). Yuengert (1995),
Hammarstedt (2001) and Hout and Rosen (1999) have found an effect from a 


 in the country of origin. 	
 and re-employment prospects can affect entry
to and exit from self-employment. Meager (1992) interprets procyclical entry rates as a
consequence of demand side factors, whereas Carrasco (1999) mentions good re-employment
prospects as an alternative explanation. Borjas (1986) argues that ethnic enclaves, as defined by
2a high fraction of immigrants from a certain region, are a significant explanation of self-
employment among immigrants. The argument is that it is easier to attract customers and
employees in an area with inhabitants of similar ethnic origin (Borjas and Bronars 1989). The
evidence, however, is mixed. Clark and Drinkwater (2000) find a negative effect, whereas Aldrich
and Waldinger (1990), Yuengert (1995) and Bager and Rezaei (2001) find no effect of ethnic
enclaves. In some sectors there is a considerable need for capital when starting a business.
Therefore 
	


 need to be considered (Lindh and Olsson 1996; Blanchflower and
Oswald 1998; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Taylor 2001). To loosen the liquidity constraints,
public self-employment support has been introduced in many countries including Denmark. The
success of such a support has been questioned (Pfeiffer and Reize 2000).
We estimate the transition probabilities using discrete competing risks models. The data are
register based panel data sets for 1984-97 for 40% of all male immigrants in Denmark and a
sample of 2% of the male native population. The data have several advantages. Firstly, it is a long
panel of 14 years. Secondly, the data are known to be very reliable and precisely measured.
The empirical analysis reveals that immigrants have very different transition patterns compared
to natives. For immigrants from Western countries, this is mainly due to differences in individual
characteristics. When controlling for individual characteristics, we find that the populations of
immigrants from Western countries are not self-employed marginalized. For immigrants from
non-Western countries, however, the picture is significantly different. For these immigrants we
find that a large proportion is characterized as self-employed marginalized, even when controlling
for observed and unobserved individual characteristics. For immigrants from Turkey, Vietnam,
Iran and immigrants with no citizenship, more than half of the population are identified as self-
employed marginalized. This indicates that these immigrants use self-employment as a last resort.
In section II, the different types of immigrants are defined, and the self-employed marginalized
type is discussed in detail. The data for the empirical analysis are presented in section III. The
analysis ignoring individual characteristics is found in section IV. In section V, the discrete
competing risks model is presented followed by the results of the estimation in section VI.
Section VII concludes the paper.
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We propose a new framework to investigate the existence of self-employed
marginalized. The framework consists of types of immigrants defined by their transition
3probabilities between labor market states relative to natives. The labor market states are self-
employment (SE), wage-employment (WE) and non-employment (NE).  Figure 1 illustrates all
possible transitions between the three states.
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The transition probabilities of immigrants are investigated relative to natives. For example, an
immigrant in state NE can exit to WE and SE. Among these two exits, one can dominate the other
in terms of transition probabilities relative to natives. Suppose that the probabilities of both
transitions from NE to SE and from NE to WE are 0.5 for immigrants, whereas the corresponding
probabilities for natives are 0.4 and 0.6. Then transitions from NE to SE dominate transitions out
of NE for immigrants relative to natives. We call such a transition a relatively dominant
transition.
A relatively dominant transition is determined by the transition probabilities of an immigrant
compared to those of a native with the same characteristics and duration in a given state. Since
our interest will be to study differences in transition behavior, we consider probabilities
conditional on exit from a given state. Let x0 be a vector of individual characteristics and d0 the
duration in a state. Then a state 1 is defined to be a relatively dominant transition out of state 0
if:
PI(St = 1 | St-1 = 0, St  0, x0, d0) - PN(St = 1 | St-1 = 0, St  0 , x0, d0) > 0,
where subscripts I and N refer to an immigrant and a native, respectively. When there are two
4exits, as in our case, there is  one or no  relatively dominant transition from each state. The values
of x0 and d0 are the same for the immigrant and the native. For practical purposes, one needs to
choose which characteristics to condition upon. One suggestion would be to use characteristics
of a median immigrant. Then the transition probabilities of a (non-existing) native using the same
characteristics are constructed to determine whether a state constitutes a relatively dominant
transition from the state of exit.
With three states it is possible to define eight exhaustive types of immigrants based on
relatively dominant transitions. They are listed in Table 1. For example, an immigrant of Type
1 has non-employment as the relatively dominant transition from both self-employment and
wage-employment, and self-employment as the relatively dominant transition from non-
employment. It means that an immigrant of Type 1 is more likely to exit into non-employment
from self-employment or wage-employment, and to self-employment from non-employment
compared to a native with the same characteristics and duration in the exiting state. Later in this
section, more details are provided about the types.
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no Out of
SE
Out of
WE
Out of
NE
Attractor
state
Escape
state
- NE NE SE Self-employed  marginalized NE SE
2 NE NE WE Wage-employed marginalized NE WE
3 NE SE SE Self-employment tradition SE NE
4 NE SE WE Stepping-stone to SE - -
5 WE NE SE Stepping-stone to WE - -
6 WE NE WE Wage-employment tradition WE NE
7 WE SE SE Self-employment tradition SE WE
8 WE SE WE Wage-employment tradition WE SE
For six of the eight types, the same relatively dominant transition occurs twice. For example,
for Type 1, the state non-employment is a relatively dominant transition from the other two states.
We denote such a state an attractor state because immigrants are relatively more likely to make
5transitions into this state compared to natives. If an attractor state exists, we define an escape state
as the relatively dominant transition state from the attractor state. In case of Type 1, the escape
state is self-employment since this is the relatively dominant transition from the attractor state
non-employment. The characterization of states as attractor and escape states will be useful to
highlight differences to natives.
Immigrants with non-employment as attractor state are more likely than natives to make
transitions from other states into non-employment. Being outside employment is typically denoted
marginalized. In our framework, we denote immigrants with attractor state non-employment as
marginalized. Two types of marginalized immigrants exist, namely Type 1 and Type 2. The only
difference is that Type 1 has self-employment as escape state whereas Type 2 has wage-
employment. Therefore, we call Type 1 self-employed marginalized and Type 2 wage-employed
marginalized. The relatively dominant transitions of a self-employed marginalized immigrant are
marked in Figure 2 with bold arrows.
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Our definition of self-employed or wage-employed marginalized differs from the usual
definition of marginalized. Usually, marginalized individuals in the labor market are non-
employed with high probability.  This probability, however, can be decomposed into two sources:
a low probability of leaving non-employment and a high probability of becoming non-employed.
While numerous important studies have focused on the former, our framework allows us also to
1 We are not the first to apply combinations of transition rates to identify a labor market state. Though focusing on marginal
attachment to the labor force rather than marginalization, Jones and Riddell (1999) also used transition probabilities to identify
a new labor market state.
6
analyze the latter.1 In the remaining part of the paper, we focus solely on marginalization as
defined above by use of transition probabilities.
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The central empirical question posed in the introduction is whether some immigrants use self-
employment as a last resort. Using the types defined in Table 1, we define a self-employed
immigrant of Type 1, the self-employed marginalized type, to be an immigrant using self-
employment as a last resort. A non-employed immigrant can be a self-employed marginalized
type but will be using self-employment as a last resort only if he actually becomes self-employed.
A self-employed marginalized immigrant in non-employment or wage-employment can thus be
thought of as an immigrant potentially using self-employment as a last resort.
According to the definition in Table 1, the transition probabilities of a self-employed
marginalized satisfy the following three conditions:
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Condition i) insures that a self-employed immigrant is more likely to exit to non-employment
than to wage-employment compared to a native. Condition ii) insures that this is also the case
from wage-employment. Conditions i) and ii) imply that non-employment is an attractor state.
Finally, condition iii) insures that the immigrant is more likely to become self-employed than a
native with the same characteristics when exiting from non-employment. 
The conditions stated above do not relate to the survival probability as self-employed because
the implications for the survival rate are ambiguous. On the one hand, a self-employed
marginalized immigrant may have a lower survival rate due to a  lack of entrepreneurial skills.
On the other hand, if the alternatives to self-employment are poor, for instance non-employment,
then one would expect self-employed marginalized to have a higher survival rate as self-
employed. This is a reason for using the relatively dominant transition probabilities.
7As mentioned in the introduction, a number of hypotheses concerning self-employment of
immigrants have been suggested in the literature. As we will show, some of them correspond to
the types defined in Table 1. Suppose condition i) does not hold, but ii) and iii) do. Then an
immigrant is Type 5, see Table 1. A Type 5 immigrant does not have an attractor state. He is more
likely than natives to exit non-employment to self-employment, self-employment to wage-
employment and finally back from wage-employment to non-employment. Such a pattern can be
caused by using self-employment as a stepping-stone to wage-employment. The mechanism is
that immigrants may obtain skills (e.g. profiency in language) while working as self-employed,
which will improve their chances to become wage-employed. Suppose now condition ii) does not
hold but i) and iii) do. Then the immigrant is Type 3. A Type 3 immigrant has self-employment
as an attractor state. Hence, the immigrant is more likely to become self-employed when leaving
one of the other two states than a native. Such a behavior could be induced by a self-employment
tradition relative to natives, for instance, if the immigrant came from a country with a high rate
of self-employment. Finally, suppose condition iii) does not hold, but i) and ii) do. Then the
immigrant is Type 2. Non-employment is an attractor state, and the immigrant is marginalized
in the sense we discussed above. The difference to the self-employed marginalized is that the
immigrant is more likely to exit non-employment to wage-employment compared to natives.
In characterizing an immigrant, for instance, as self-employed marginalized, the immigrant is
compared to a native with exactly the same individual characteristics. The only observable
difference is country of origin. Hence, if there is to be a difference between immigrants and
natives, it can only arise from two sources: country of origin or different relationship between
individual characteristics and transition probabilities. In either case, the factors that lead to a
difference, for instance, in coefficients on observable characteristics are unobserved. The factors
could be barriers in the labor market, e.g. discrimination.
In order to ascribe differences in transition behavior to barriers, it is critical in the empirical
implementation, that relevant individual differences in, for instance, preferences are captured by
the characteristics included in the estimation. If this is not the case, condition i) to iii) would also
be consistent with an immigrant having strong preferences for not working and preferring self-
employment to wage-employment. In addition to controlling for preferences including many
individual characteristics, we are also able to exploit the panel data structure of our data. This
allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and therefore we are likely to capture
unobserved time-invariant differences in preferences.
2 For a further description of immigrants in Denmark and the applied data set, see e.g. Husted et al. (2001). 
3 Incl. agriculture (roughly 20% of natives).
4 Incl. part-time employment, which is a small number.
8
Finally, variation on some characteristics can be used as an indirect check of preference
differences. In the empirical implementation, we focus on two variables in this respect. The first
variable concerns changes in the transition rates over the business cycle. If immigrants experience
transitions from non-employment into self-employment in a recession, whereas natives do not,
it suggests that when the general unemployment is high and the chance of getting a job is low,
immigrants tend to start as self-employed. This indicates that immigrants use self-employment
as a last resort. The second variable concerns entitlement to unemployment benefit. If there are
preferences for not working, self-employment may be used as a way of obtaining eligibility for
unemployment insurance benefit. Hence, this should lead to transition from self-employment to
non-employment as soon as the eligibility is obtained.
*&
The empirical study is based on longitudinal data sets from Danish administrative
registers. One data set contains information on all immigrants in Denmark (about 300,000
individuals in 1997) aged 15 and above2 in the period 1984-1997. We randomly select 40% to
reduce the sample, and furthermore we exclude 2nd generation immigrants. In order to compare
with natives, a second data set is used based upon a 10% panel sample of the whole Danish
population aged 15 and above (about 500,000 individuals each year). We select men aged 30-50
since this group has finished education, but not started early retirement. To obtain data on all
important variables, we use annual observations. We base the empirical analysis on the years
1988-1997 and only apply the observations from 1984-87 to draw inference on spell durations
and reduce problems of left-censoring. The final sample of immigrants contains 118,838
observations from 22,243 immigrant men, and the sample of natives contains 121,628
observations from 18,723 native men.  All the variables included are described in Appendix A.
In the following, we discuss some of them.
The labor market status, which forms the basis for the construction of the dependent variable,
is divided into three different states: self-employment3 (SE), wage-employment4 (WE) and non-
employment (NE). If an individual experiences more than one state in a year, the predominant
5 EC-12 contains the12 EU member states prior to the expansion in 1997. 
9
state is chosen.
 Table 2 shows the distribution of labor market states for natives and immigrants from different
countries of origin. The countries of origin consist of the following groups: Scandinavia, EC-125,
Ex-Yugoslavia, other developed countries (DCs), Turkey, Pakistan, Vietnam, Iran, no citizenship
(Palestine) and other less developed countries (LDCs). In contrast to many other OECD countries,
the rate of self-employment of males in Denmark has decreased during the last ten years (Leung
and Robinson, 1998; Blanchflower, 2000). For immigrants from less developed countries, the
self-employment rates are higher than for natives in 1997 except for the residual category of other
LDCs. From 1988 to 1997 there is a steep increase in the proportion of self-employment for
immigrants from most less developed countries. The steep increase in the self-employment rates
for Turks and Pakistanis was coupled with an increase in non-employment, whereas for Iranians
and immigrants without citizenship, it was coupled with an increase in wage-employment. This
is suggestive for self-employment being used for different reasons for immigrants from different
countries. The pattern in Table 2 conceals, however, that all variation is due to changing
background factors and individual characteristics.
+.2
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Self-employment¤) Wage-employment Non-employment
1988 1992 1997 1988 1992 1997 1988 1992 1997
----- % -----
Natives 11.5 10.5 9.0 74.2 70.6 73.2 14.3 18.9 17.8
Immigrants     
 Scandinavia 9.1 9.8 8.6 62.8 59.1 62.9 27.5 31.2 28.4
 EC-12 11.3 12.4 12.4 67.4 61.6 60.5 21.3 26.0 27.1
 Ex-Yugoslavia 6.0 5.8 3.3 68.2 58.4 35.9 25.0 35.8 60.9
 Other DCs 10.4 12.0 10.7 60.0 53.3 55.6 29.5 34.7 33.7
 Turkey 5.8 10.8 15.9 58.0 45.6 44.3 36.2 43.6 39.7
 Pakistan 15.7 21.0 22.3 53.7 38.3 38.4 30.6 40.6 39.3
 Vietnam 9.4 9.9 10.7 50.9 40.2 49.7 39.7 49.9 39.6
 Iran 4.4 6.3 16.0 17.4 34.6 33.0 78.1 59.1 51.0
 No Citizenship 5.2 7.0 14.4 14.0 21.4 17.1 80.8 71.5 68.5
 Other LDCs 9.7 9.1 8.7 49.5 42.5 38.9 40.8 48.3 52.4
¤) Including agriculture.
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To control for individual characteristics and effects mentioned in the introduction, we have
obtained data on individual eligibility for unemployment benefit and when the unemployment
benefit expires. Eligibility to self-employment support and when it expires is also available. In
addition to entitlement and expiration indicators, data also include educational attainment, labor
market experience, an indicator for living in a big city and finally an indicator for being a property
owner. For immigrants, age at migration, country of origin and immigrant status (refugee/non-
refugee) are observed. We also include the concentration of immigrants in a local area and
whether the individual is a Danish citizen and cohabits with a native. Further details are given in
Appendix A.
9*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In this section, we explore transitions between the states ignoring individual
characteristics except country of origin. We use the prefix unconditional on the corresponding
transition probabilities to indicate that individual characteristics have not been taken into account.
In Table 3, we compare unconditional transition probabilities between natives and immigrants.
+.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Natives SE(t) WE(t) NE(t)
SE(t-1) 0.875 0.089 0.037
WE(t-1) 0.015 0.944 0.041
NE(t-1) 0.026 0.180 0.794
Immigrants
SE(t-1) 0.820 0.080 0.100
WE(t-1) 0.020 0.853 0.127
NE(t-1) 0.033 0.169 0.797
The main noticeable difference between immigrants and natives is the transition probabilities out
of self-employment and wage-employment into non-employment. These probabilities are larger
for immigrants compared to natives.
Our definition of types is based on the transition probabilities conditional on leaving the state.
The result with no control for individual characteristics is shown in Table 4. The first three
11
columns refer to the transition probabilities used in conditions i) to iii). In column four, we
indicate the most likely type of immigrant as defined in Table 1.
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i) ii) iii)
"/ 0.294 0.732 0.126
 0.556 0.864 0.163 1
')/ 0.433 0.814 0.182 1
0-2 0.427 0.817 0.134 1
:;	/ 0.324 0.920 0.069 2
<1&0 0.517 0.816 0.173 1
+!
 0.726 0.923 0.124 2
=! 0.660 0.860 0.224 1
9 0.859 0.922 0.184 1
 0.744 0.880 0.292 1
"	0%1 0.866 0.890 0.360 1
<1&0 0.629 0.895 0.147 1
 
The immigrant groups have very different transition probabilities compared to natives, and
they are all of the two marginalized types. Immigrants from  Ex-Yugoslavia and Turkey are the
wage-employed marginalized type while the remaining groups are the self-employed marginalized
type. Since the determination of types in Table 4 ignores individual characteristics, it raises the
question the explanation is different (human capital) characteristics among immigrants  compared
to natives. We investigate this in the remaining part of the paper.
9*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To determine the immigrant types after conditioning on individual characteristics, it
is necessary to estimate a model of the transition probabilities between all three states. Since the
durations in our panel data set are measured discretely, we estimate a discrete competing risks
12
model. We allow for duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in terms of  random
effects.
The discrete competing risks model can be formulated using transition probabilities. We
estimate transitions out of a state separately for each state. For the sake of notation, focus on
transitions from a state 0. Let P0m(d) be the :transition probability of leaving state 0 and entering
state m as a function of the duration, d, in state 0. The transition probability is a function of
individual characteristics. Let 0

denote the observed vector of explanatory variables for
individual i at time t and 1

 an unobserved individual effect. The duration dependence is modelled
using dummy variables. Define a five dimensional vector, 

, consisting of five dummy variables,
where only one of them is 1 corresponding to the duration being equal to either 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5
years. This leads us to a transition probability of a linear index given by ,
where m and m are vectors of coefficients.
The transition probabilities are assumed to be multinomial logistic. It is necessary to make a
normalization to identify the parameters. We set all parameters equal to zero for m equal to 0.
Then the transition probability is:
To derive the likelihood function, first consider the likelihood contribution conditional on the
unobserved heterogeneity 1. To keep notation tractable, let J0 be the number of time periods spent
in state 0, { ,.., } the time periods in calendar time spent in state 0 and ct  {0,1,2} the state
to which the individual exits at the end of time t. Then the likelihood contribution of individual
i is:
,
where I() is the indicator function. The expression is equivalent to the likelihood contribution in
a multinomial logit model with three alternatives.
The unobserved heterogeneity is estimated as random effects in each risk. We follow the
practice of Heckman and Singer (1984) by assuming that the random effects are discretely
6 Not to be confused with types defined in section II.
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distributed with unknown support points. The distribution of 1

 is assumed to have a support of
two points in each risk, where one of the points in each risk is normalized to 0. Hence, the joint
distribution of 2113 has support  = {(0,0) , (0,2) , (1,0) , (1,2)}, where each outcome occurs
with probability 00, 02, 10 and 12, respectively. The four points of support in  can be
interpreted as four latent types of individuals.6 Let  = (1,2) and  = (00,02,10,12). We
assume the Zi
ms are independent over individuals and that they are independent of the explanatory
variables. Then the likelihood contribution for an individual can be obtained by integrating the
conditional likelihood contribution:
,
where (s) is the probability of the outcome s. Finally, the likelihood function is the product over
all individuals. Since we do not assume any restrictions between transitions from the different
states of exit, we can estimate a model for each state of exit separately based on a likelihood
function similar to the one derived here for state 0.
9*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In this section we discuss the results from the estimation of the discrete competing
risks model and the identification of types. In subsection A, we discuss the estimates from the
model, and in subsection B we focus on types and how they change dependent on the duration
in different states. Finally in subsection C, we investigate the type of all the immigrants in order
to identify the proportion of self-employed marginalized among immigrants. This proportion for
self-employed immigrants is an estimate of the proportion of immigrants using self-employment
as a last resort.
			

We estimate three discrete competing risks models for immigrants and three for natives. The three
estimated models for immigrants give the transition probabilities from each of the three states,
and similarly for natives. The results are presented in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B.
The duration dependence is negative in all states for both natives and immigrants.  This can
be seen on the decreasing values of the coefficients to the duration dummies, . The negative
14
duration dependence implies that the probability of making a transition out of a state decreases
with the duration in that state.
We control for effects reported in other empirical studies mentioned in the literature review
in the introduction. Below, we comment on several of these effects.
One effect comes from ethnic enclaves. A higher concentration of immigrants in the area of
residence exerts a negative effect on all transition probabilities out of a state. For example, a
higher concentration of immigrants lowers the probability of exiting self-employment, but it also
lowers the probability of entry into self-employment from the two other states. The overall effect
cannot be calculated directly. For our purpose, the overall effect is not important. What is
important is that the model controls for ethnic enclaves.
Another effect stems from liquidity constraints. Several variables control for this effect. One
is the Public Self-employment Support (PSS). This support facilitates the process of establishing
a business. One would expect the variables indicating entitlement to public self-employment
support to increase the transition probailities from non-employment to self-employment. One
would also expect the variables indicating the expiration or non-existence of entitlement to public
self-employment support to increase the transition probabilities from self-employment. The
results in Table B2 confirm both expectations.
Self-employment can be used to obtain entitlement to Unemployment Insurance Benefit (UIB).
If it is the case, the variables indicating entitlement to UIB should be positive when exiting self-
employment to non-employment. This, however, is neither the case for immigrants nor for natives
in Tables B2 and B1, respectively. Hence, the results do not provide evidence that immigrants or
natives use self-employment to obtain entitlement to the unemployment benefits.
In periods with high local unemployment, immigrants tend to enter self-employment from non-
employment, whereas this does not happen for natives. As argued in section II, this may be
interpreted as a piece of evidence for immigrants using self-employment as a last resort.
Unobserved heterogeneity plays a role in most of the transition probabilities. There is evidence
of four latent types of individuals when determining the transitions out of self-employment and
wage-employment. Out of non-employment, there is only evidence of one latent type for
immigrants and two for natives.
 
!"#
In this subsection, we investigate how the duration dependence influences the determination of
7 As latent types we choose the one of the four unobserved types with the highest probability mass.
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immigrant types introduced in section II. The types are determined from the transition
probabilities of an immigrant compared to a native conditional on the same characteristics and
duration.
To illustrate the impact of duration dependence, we choose to focus on the countries Turkey,
Pakistan, Vietnam, Iran and immigrants with no citizenship. A (non-existing) standardized
individual is constructed with characteristics chosen as the median of the characteristics7 over all
the immigrants from these countries. For this standardized individual, conditional transition
probabilities are calculated for each country using the country-specific dummy variable.
Therefore, the only difference in transition probabilities among immigrants with characteristics
of the standardized individual arises from the country-specific dummy variables whereas
differences to a native with the same characteristics also can arise from different estimates on
parameters related to duration dependence or explanatory variables.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the transition probabilities conditional on leaving the state for an
immigrant from each country with characteristics of the standardized individual as a function of
the duration. Figure 3 shows the transition probability out of self-employment. It shows that
immigrants and natives have about  90% probability of finishing short spells (less than two years)
of self-employment into non-employment. At elapsed durations above two years, immigrants have
substantially higher probability of exit to non-employment compared to natives. After a duration
of five years, natives have a 50-50 probability of exit to non-employment and wage-employment,
whereas the corresponding probabilities for immigrants are 75-25 for Iranians, who come closest
to the natives. The figure shows that for durations in self-employment longer than two years, the
condition i) in our definition of self-employed marginalized is fulfilled for all the immigrants
considered.
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In Figure 4, the transition probabilities from  wage-employment are shown for the standardized
individuals. For both  natives and immigrants, the most likely transition is to non-employment,
namely with probabilities between 86% and 98%. There are, however, differences between
immigrants. Turkish and Vietnamese immigrants always have higher probabilities of exiting to
non-employment compared to natives, whereas the opposite is the case for Iranians and
individuals with no citizenship. Since this figure illustrates condition ii) in the definition of self-
employed marginalized, it is seen that Turkish and Vietnamese immigrants with characteristics
of the standardized individual will fulfill condition ii) independently of the duration in wage-
employment, whereas Pakistani immigrants only satisfy condition ii) for durations longer than
three years.
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Finally, Figure 5 shows that immigrants always have a higher probability of becoming self-
employed than the native when exiting non-employment. For the native there is about a 10%
probability of an exit to self-employment and 90 percent probability to wage-employment after
a spell of non-employment. The similar numbers for immigrants are a 20% exit to self-
employment and a 80% exit to wage-employment. This indicates that the last condition iii) is
fulfilled for all the immigrants considered. In conclusion, Figures 3 to 5 highlight that the duration
dependence influences whether conditions i) to iii) hold or not.
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The duration dependence implies that an immigrant can change his  type (as defined in section
II) over the duration of a spell. Below, we investigate how immigrants change type for
combinations of different durations in the three states. For each country, we calculate the median
characteristics over all immigrants from that country. Denote such a (non-existing) immigrant as
a median immigrant. For each country, the transition probabilities are calculated for the median
immigrant and compared to a native with the same characteristics as the median immigrant.
In Table 5, the differences in transition probabilities between median immigrants and natives
are reported. The differences correspond to the left-hand sides of conditions i) to iii) using median
immigrants and different durations. In order to characterize an individual as self-employed
marginalized, the sign of the differences must be positive. Table 5 shows that condition iii) is
satisfied for all median immigrants independently of the duration except for Ex-Yugoslavia with
three years of duration. Also, there are substantial differences between the median immigrants
even when a condition is satisfied. On the basis of the results in Table 5, one can identify the
types of the immigrant groups.
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D=1 D=3 D=5 D=1 D=3 D=5 D=1 D=3 D=5
')/ -0.143 0.079 -0.111 0.019 0.038 0.008 0.088 0.038 0.077
0-2 -0.152 0.066 -0.125 0.016 0.032 0.004 0.059 0.020 0.054
:;	/ -0.264 -0.081 -0.277 0.024 0.045 0.022 0.013 -0.009 0.022
<1&0 -0.123 0.094 -0.089 0.004 0.011 -0.022 0.089 0.038 0.079
+!
 -0.028 0.193 0.069 0.021 0.041 0.020 0.084 0.035 0.074
=! -0.063 0.150 -0.002 0.003 0.010 -0.019 0.152 0.083 0.125
9 0.004 0.213 0.134 0.014 0.027 0.004 0.140 0.069 0.123
 -0.040 0.122 0.007 0.001 0.005 -0.023 0.265 0.166 0.234
"	0%1 -0.006 0.155 0.081 -0.009 -0.012 -0.038 0.303 0.199 0.265
<1&0 -0.054 0.156 0.013 0.023 0.043 0.019 0.072 0.024 0.068
In Table 6, the inferred types are listed. The table shows that immigrants from Ex-Yugoslavia
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are always Type 5 or Type 6, which indicates a stepping-stone to wage-employment or wage-
employment tradition. From the table, it is seen that the duration in self-employment and wage-
employment does not have an impact on the determination of types for immigrants from Ex-
Yugoslavia. When duration in non-employment is 1 or 5 years, Ex-Yugoslavians are Type 5,
whereas when the duration in non-employment is 3 years, they are Type 6.
 For median immigrants from Scandinavia and EC-12, they are characterized as Type 5 in 2/3
of the combinations of durations. This suggests that they mainly use self-employment as a
stepping-stone to wage-employment. In the remaining combinations of durations, median
immigrants from Scandinavia and EC-12 are characterized as self-employed marginalized. In
particular, this occurs when the duration in self-employment is three years. The same pattern is
also found for other median immigrants. In general, median immigrants tend to be characterized
as self-employed marginalized when the spell of self-employment is terminated after three years.
One explanation for this finding could be that terminating a self-employment spell after three
years coincides with the expiration of  the public self-employment support. 
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Duration, SE 1 1 1 3 3 3 5 5 5
Duration, WE 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5
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 Scandinavia (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (5,5,5)
 EC-12 (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (5,5,5)
 Ex-Yugoslavia (5,6,5) (5,6,5) (5,6,5) (5,6,5) (5,6,5) (5,6,5) (5,6,5) (5,6,5) (5,6,5)
 Other DCs (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (7,7,7) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (3,3,3) (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (7,7,7)
 Turkey (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1)
 Pakistan (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (7,7,7) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (3,3,3) (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (7,7,7)
 Vietnam (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1)
 Iran (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (7,7,7) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (3,3,3) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (3,3,3)
 No Citizenship (7,7,7) (7,7,7) (7,7,7) (3,3,3) (3,3,3) (3,3,3) (3,3,3) (3,3,3) (3,3,3)
 Other LDCs (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (5,5,5) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1)
Note: The three types in parentheses correspond to a duration of 1, 3 and 5 years in non-employment.
The only median immigrants always characterized as self-employed marginalized are the
Vietnamese. Turks and individuals from LDC are in 2/3 of the combination of durations
characterized as self-employed marginalized except when they have short spells of self-
employment. In this case, they are Type 5. Immigrants from other DCs, Pakistan and Iran change
among Types 1,3, 5 and 7.  Finally, individuals with no citizenship are characterized as Types 3
or 7, which means that their behavior is consistent with a self-employment tradition.
A comparison between the results in Table 6 and Table 4, where the identification of types is
done ignoring individual characteristics, reveals large differences. When ignoring individual
characteristics, most immigrants are self-employed marginalized, whereas when controlling for
individual characteristics, a much more complex picture is seen. Two important implications can
be inferred. First, the fact that most immigrants were characterized as self-employed marginalized
was partly caused by differences in individual characteristics between immigrants and natives.
Second, even when controlling for individual characteristics, the existence of self-employed
marginalized among certain immigrant groups persists.
The results reported in this subsection show the existence of self-employed marginalization
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for immigrants with different characteristics and durations. In the last subsection, we derive the
types of the actual Danish immigrants.
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In this subsection we derive (macro) implications for the actual population of immigrants based
on the discrete competing risks models. At a given point in time, it is possible to label each
immigrant according to the 8 types. Then the fraction of self-employed marginalized among self-
employed immigrants, and thus the fraction of immigrants using self-employment as a last resort,
can be calculated .
To calculate the transition probabilities for an immigrant, it is necessary to choose a duration
in each of the states. Typically, it is not possible to do this based on actual transition history of
an immigrant. The reason is that most immigrants only experience one or two transitions in the
sample period. It is possible, however, to calculate the distribution of durations for any immigrant
given his characteristics. Let
P00,t(d) =  P(St = 0 | St-1 = 0, x0, d).
Then the probability, P0,t(d), of observing a duration of length d in a state 0 at time t is:
P0,t(d) = P00,t-(d-1)(1)P00,t-(d-2)(2)   P00,t-1(d-1)(1-P00,t(d)).
Based on the distribution of durations for each immigrant, we use the median duration in each of
the three states when calculating the transition probabilities used in conditions i) to iii).
After identifying the type of an immigrant, we calculate the proportion of self-employed
marginalized among all self-employed, wage-employed and non-employed immigrants in 1997.
The result is shown in Table 7. The numbers show that among Turks, Pakistanis, Iranians,
Vietnamese and individuals with no citizenship more than half of the self-employed are self-
employed marginalized and thus using self-employment as a last resort. Among non-employed,
the proportion of the self-employed marginalized type is lower and it is lowest among the wage-
employed immigrants. The last column is a weighted average of the previous columns, and it
shows that in total more than 50% of the immigrants from Turkey, Vietnam, Iran and individuals
with no citizenship are of the self-employed marginalized type.
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Self-employed Wage-employed Non-employed Total
Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion
')/ 0.155 0.175 0.206 0.185
0-2 0.075 0.060 0.103 0.073
:;	/ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
<1&0 0.215 0.160 0.148 0.163
+!
 0.687 0.552 0.691 0.639
=! 0.434 0.350 0.332 0.361
9 0.733 0.654 0.585 0.639
 0.691 0.498 0.472 0.517
"	0%1 0.716 0.418 0.632 0.613
<1&0 0.425 0.234 0.304 0.284
Differences in human capital cannot explain why a large proportion of immigrants are
categorized as self-employed marginalized. In Table 4, section IV, immigrants are labeled a
certain type only based on country of origin. Except for immigrants from Ex-Yugoslavia and
Turkey, everyone else is the self-employed marginalized type. When controlling for individual
characteristics, it is seen in Table 7 that a large proportion of the population still is the self-
employed marginalized type.
The identification of types is based on a comparison of transition probabilities, for instance,
as stated in conditions i) to iii) for the self-employed marginalized type. Since a condition may
be either satisfied or not, this led us to the eight different types. To satisfy, say, condition i), there
may be a small or a large difference between the transition probabilities for the immigrant and
the corresponding (non-existing) native. If the difference is small, the identification of a type is
weak in the sense that a small change in the transition probability can change the type. Suppose
the transition probabilities in each of the three conditions are close to those of natives. Assuming
independence between transition probabilities from different states, there is about 1/8 probability
of observing each type. In this light, the proportion of Scandinavians and immigrants from other
DCs being self-employed marginalized is about 1/8, and thus they behave much like natives.
The robustness of our results in Table 7 is investigated by calculating the density of the
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differences between transition probabilities of immigrants and their corresponding (non-existing)
natives. The densities are calculated from the left-hand side of the conditions i) to iii). Figure 6
shows the densities for these left-hand sides for each country. For Vietnam, the country of origin
with the highest proportion of self-employed marginalized, the density of the left-hand side in
condition i) is located on the positive part of the axis. This implies that condition i) is satisfied
for all Vietnamese immigrants. The left-hand sides of condition i) are quite large, for instance
they are larger than 0.25 for half of the Vietnamese immigrants. In other words, a Vietnamese
always has a larger probability of entering non-employment from self-employment compared to
a native. For Turkey, Iran and individuals with no citizenship, which constitutes the other
countries of origin with the high proportion of self-employed marginalized, a similar picture is
seen.
The graph also reveals why we do not find any self-employed marginalized among Ex-
Yugoslavian, since condition i) and iii) are concentrated on the negative part of the axis. For
Scandinavians and other DCs, the countries with about 1/8 proportion of self-employed
marginalized, the densities are concentrated about 0. The figure also reveals that there is quite
some variation in the transition probabilities from self-employment to non-employment. The
overall conclusion is that the determination of types for the countries with a high proportion of
self-employed marginalized is robust since the densities of the differences of the left-hand sides
of conditions i) to iii) are not concentrated about 0.
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In many countries, immigrants have a high rate of self-employment. In the literature,
a number of different explanations have been suggested. We have focused on a new explanation,
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namely that immigrants use self-employment as a last resort. To address the validity of this
explanation, we propose a method to identify self-employed marginalized by using transition
probabilities between self-employment, wage-employment and non-employment.
We find evidence that self-employed marginalized exist in the Danish labor market. The
empirical analysis indicates that especially many Turks, Vietnamese, Iranians and immigrants with
no citizenship are self-employed marginalized. For those groups, more than half of the immigrants
are characterized as self-employed marginalized and the proportion is even higher for those who
currently are self-employed. This indicates that self-employment is used as a last resort.
The fact that we find self-employed marginalized among certain immigrants indicates that these
immigrants may face barriers in the Danish labor market. When identifying self-employed
marginalized, we control for a number of individual-specific characteristics relating to the human
capital and time-invariant unobserved characteristics. Hence, the barriers arise from other
unobserved characteristics (e.g. language proficiencies) or discrimination.  
In this paper, we analyze marginalization in the labor market differently from earlier studies.
Usually, the focus has been on the survival probability in non-employment. In contrast, we identify
marginalized immigrants based on their transitions in and out of all the states. As a result, we
discovered significant differences in transitions among immigrants and natives. Our method,
however, also casts new light on other effects prompting self-employment. For instance, our
method identifies immigrants with a self-employment tradition and immigrants who use self-
employment as a stepping-stone to wage-employment. Hence, both approaches provide important
insight on marginalization and, in general, the behavior of immigrants in the labor market.
We apply the method to identify types of immigrants in Denmark. For future research, it would
be very interesting to apply the method for other countries to investigate the existence of self-
employed marginalized. A cross-country comparison may also help to identify the barriers on the
labor market, that causes immigrants to be self-employed marginalized. Although we have only
used the method in this study, we believe the method can be applied in other contexts.
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The data is register based with annual observations. Our definition of self-employment relies on
two variables concerning employment status. The primary variable is a pure register-based
variable and relates to the dominating employment status during the year, while the secondary
variable is constructed on the basis of several other variables. Only in cases where the primary
variable is missing, we use the secondary variable.  If the secondary variable is also missing,  we
are not able to determine the state of employment which will therefore be missing. Furthermore,
if a person is registered with employment other than self-employment but receives public self-
employment support, we treat him as self-employed. 
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1 Elapsed duration 1 year  in the current state 
2 Elapsed duration 2 years  in the current state
3 Elapsed duration 3 years  in the current state
4 Elapsed duration 4 years  in the current state
4+ Elapsed duration >4 years  in the current state
Im_year_unknown: Dummy, (1 if date of immigration missing) 0.308 ,9:;
Local U : Local unemployment rate 0.103 ,,;9 0.102 ,,;;
Conc_immi: Concentration of immigrants (all immigrants) 0.059 ,,+-
EC-12: Country indicator  (European Community
prior to the expansion in 1997)
0.272 ,99-
Ex-Yugoslavia: Country indicator 0.056 ,;+,
ODC: Country indicator (Other Developed
Countries)
0.110 ,+5+
Turkey: Country indicator 0.092 ,;<6
Pakistan: Country indicator 0.056 ,;;6
Vietnam: Country indicator 0.018 ,5++
Iran: Country indicator 0.041 ,567
No-state: Country indicator (No citizenship) 0.025 ,5--
OLDC: Country indicator  (Other Less Developed
Countries)
0.177 ,+<;
Education   : Length of education in Denmark 0.111 ,,+7 0.049 ,,:,
Experience   : Labor market experience in Denmark in years 0.164 ,,77 0.091 ,,7<
Years_U_in DK : Years spent unemployed in Denmark 0.036 ,,9-
Single  : Dummy (1 if single) 0.237 ,9;- 0.274 ,99:
Age_migration : Age when immigrated to Denmark 0.342 ,,6;
Refugee  : Dummy (1 if considered a refugee) 0.184 ,+<<
DK citizen : Dummy (1 if possess a Danish citizenship) 0.369 ,9<;
DK partner : Dummy (1 if Danish partner) 0.353 ,97<
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Child 0-2 : Dummy (1 if children aged 0-2 years) 0.067 ,;-, 0.127 ,+++
Child 3-9 : Dummy (1 if children aged 3-9 years) 0.231 ,9;5 0.308 ,9:;
Child 10-17 : Dummy (1 if children aged 10-17 years) 0.417 ,96+ 0.390 ,9<<
Big city : Dummy (1 if lives in a big city) 0.306 ,9:5 0.570 ,96-
Prop. Owner : Dummy (1 if property owner) 0.684 ,9:- 0.332 ,975
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  PSS11 : =1 if entitled to PPS and it is the first period
of the entitlement
=0 otherwise
0.035 ,5<9 0.066 ,;96
  PSS12 : =1 if entitled to PPS apart from the first
period of the entitlement (i.e. PSS11=0)
=0 otherwise
0.045 ,;,< 0.130 ,++:
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!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'$(
  PSS21 : =1 if entitlement to PPS expires within the
current year (conditional on being entitled in
the current year, i.e. PSS11=1 or PSS12 =1).
=0 otherwise
0.059 ,;+: 0.108 ,+5,
  PSS22 : =1 if entitlement to PPS expired more than 1
year ago (including never existed).
=0 otherwise
0.901 ,;66 0.782 ,95+
#!"&-	
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>
  UIB11 : =1 if entitled to UIB and it is the first period
of the entitlement
=0 otherwise
0.034 ,5<; 0.042 ,;,;
  UIB12 : =1 if entitled to UIB apart from the first
period of the entitlement (i.e. UIB11=0)
=0 otherwise
0.641 ,9<, 0.529 ,966
#!")* &'"+
,##"(
-	
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(
  UIB21 : =1 if entitlement to UIB expires within the
current year (conditional on being entitled in
the current year, i.e. UIB11=1 or UIB12 =1).
=0 otherwise
0.023 ,596 0.034 ,5<,
8 Different rules for e.g. students and individuals on leave.
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  UIB22 : =1 if entitlement to UIB has expired within
the last 3 years apart from the current year
(i.e. UIB21=0).
=0 otherwise
0.054 ,;;: 0.072 ,;-6
  UIB23 : =1 if entitlement to PPS expired more than 3
year ago (including never existed).
=0 otherwise
0.271 ,99- 0.357 ,976
++
	+
%&
Entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits (UIB) requires membership of an unemployment
insurance fund for more than one year and at least 26 weeks of employment within the last three
years.8 Until 1993 the entitlement expired after three years, whereas after 1993 special
circumstances (e.g. participation in a re-employment program) might justify UIB for up to seven
years. On the basis of these rules and using information from the unemployment registers,
variables concerning eligibility are constructed. The first set of variables (‘UIB11’ and ‘UIB12’)
describes whether the individual is entitled to UIB. The first variable (‘UIB11‘) describes whether
the current year is the first year of the entitlement while the second variable (‘UIB12‘) describes
whether the individual has been entitled for more than 1 year. The variables ‘UIB11’ and ‘UIB12’
are mutually exclusive. The second set of variables (‘UIB21’, ‘UIB22’ and ‘UIB23’) describes
whether entitlement to UIB has expired or never has existed. The first variable (‘UIB21‘)
describes whether the entitlement expires within the current year (conditional on being entitled
within the current year) while the second variable (‘UIB22‘) describes whether it has expired
within the last 3 years apart from the current year. The last variable (‘UIB23‘) describes whether
the entitlement has expired before 3 years ago or never has prevailed. The variables ‘UIB21’,
‘UIB22’ and ‘UIB23’ are mutually exclusive.
During the period of consideration, different rules for public self-employment support (PSS)
prevailed. Entitlement presumes UIB entitlement plus at least five months of unemployment
within the last eight months. The PSS expires after approximately three years or if the labor
market status changes. Along with the rules for entitlement, the rules for expiration have changed
during our sample period. The first set of variables (‘PSS11’ and ‘PSS12’) describes whether the
30
individuals are entitled to PSS.  The first variable (‘PSS11‘) describes whether the individual is
entitled to PPS and whether the current year is the first year of the entitlement while the second
variable (‘PSS12‘) describes whether the individual is entitled to PPS and has been entitled for
more than 1 year. The variables ‘PSS11’ and ‘PSS12’ are mutually exclusive. The second set of
variables (‘PSS21’ and ‘PSS22’) describes whether entitlement to PSS has expired. The first
variable (‘PSS21‘) describes whether the entitlement expires within the current year (conditional
on being entitled within the current year) while the second variable (‘PSS22‘) describes whether
the entitlement has expired before one year ago or never has existed. The variables ‘PSS21’ and
‘PSS22’ are mutually exclusive.
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 # # "  "
1 -0.770  -1.235 ** -3.215 ** -1.312 ** 0.237  -0.764 **
0.645 0.143 0.463 0.621 0.303 0.142
2 -1.029  -1.031 ** -3.637 ** -1.591 ** -0.370  -1.345 **
0.661 0.145 0.465 0.634 0.319 0.145
3 -1.353 ** -1.585 ** -3.782 ** -1.823 ** -0.495  -1.694 **
0.681 0.157 0.466 0.641 0.331 0.150
4 -1.435 ** -1.926 ** -3.862 ** -1.835 ** -0.627 * -1.703 **
0.688 0.170 0.465 0.647 0.340 0.156
4+ -3.294 ** -2.912 ** -4.370 ** -2.397 ** -0.822 ** -1.838 **
0.682 0.158 0.459 0.637 0.323 0.142
Local U -1.228  1.843 * 4.956 ** 5.772 ** -1.104  8.972 **
2.809 0.976 1.570 1.976 1.551 0.949
Education 3.791 ** 2.498 ** 1.755 * -6.265 ** -0.083  -8.888 **
1.582 0.573 0.990 1.055 1.066 0.597
Experience -6.462 ** 0.672 * 6.535 ** 1.631 ** -9.468 ** -8.680 **
1.001 0.364 0.627 0.696 0.709 0.415
Single -0.455 ** -0.040  0.050  0.408 ** -0.138  0.314 **
0.166 0.058 0.101 0.116 0.106 0.054
Child 0-2 0.342  0.277 ** 0.141  0.104  -0.044  -0.314 **
0.225 0.102 0.130 0.175 0.125 0.092
Child 3-9 0.170  0.166 ** 0.140 * -0.222 * 0.057  -0.419 **
0.165 0.068 0.080 0.121 0.082 0.061
Child 10-17 0.394 ** 0.202 ** 0.042  -0.092  0.119  -0.383 **
0.148 0.058 0.072 0.103 0.075 0.051
Big city 0.175  -0.005  0.061  0.169  -0.133  -0.131 **
0.153 0.053 0.088 0.105 0.090 0.052
Prop. Owner 0.891 ** 0.119 ** -0.225 ** -0.678 ** 0.569 ** -0.682 **
0.155 0.055 0.095 0.107 0.093 0.052
PSS11 0.344 **
0.167
PSS12 0.400 **
0.176
PSS21 2.080 ** 0.387  
0.363 0.251
PSS22 1.546 ** -0.903 **
0.337 0.208
UIB11 -0.606 ** 0.193 **
0.213 0.090
UIB12 -0.574 ** -0.263 **
0.097 0.051
UIB21 -0.695 ** -1.067 **
0.309 0.112
UIB22 -0.184  -0.854 **
0.189 0.067
UIB23 -0.298 * -1.024 **
0.177 0.058
32
"&!#.
1 -2.759 ** -1.787 ** -3.249 **
0.331 0.227 0.140
2 0 0.238  2.366 **
0 0.638 0.089
12 0.912 ** 0.802 ** 0.145 **
0.059 0.085 0.019
10 0.088 0.198 ** 0.773 **
0.059 0.085 0.027
02 0 0 0.001
0 0 0.003
00 0 0 0.081 **
0 0 0.020
N 17033 16406 88239
L(full) -7669.1 -6274.3 -17426.8
L(const) -8970.5 -6719.3 -18867.6
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.066 0.076
Note: ** indicates significance at a 5% level and * indicates significance at a 10% level. L(const) is the likelihood value from an
estimation including a constant term only  and a correcteion for unobserved heterogeneity. The Pseudo R2 is calculated as: 
Pesudo R2=1-(L(full)/L(const)).
 In some estimations, the full parametrization of the unobserved could not be identified. In that case, some of the parameters  and 
 are restricted to 0 to achieve identification.
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1 -1.806 ** 0.238  -1.654 ** -1.512 * -0.295  -2.081 **
0.358 0.170 0.572 0.774 0.458 0.211
2 -1.991 ** 0.775 ** -1.708 ** -1.477 * -0.711  -2.807 **
0.364 0.170 0.569 0.788 0.457 0.210
3 -2.096 ** 0.379 ** -2.174 ** -1.628 ** -0.888 * -3.046 **
0.371 0.174 0.573 0.794 0.471 0.209
4 -2.243 ** 0.280  -2.043 ** -1.965 ** -0.663  -3.078 **
0.376 0.179 0.583 0.790 0.480 0.210
4+ -2.643 ** -0.252  -2.628 ** -2.186 ** -1.082 ** -3.438 **
0.370 0.177 0.575 0.793 0.464 0.204
Im_year_unkn. 0.552 ** 0.171 ** -0.193  -0.234  0.622 ** 0.525 **
0.138 0.070 0.206 0.156 0.172 0.071
Local U 5.983 ** 1.035  4.677 ** 5.173 ** 1.727  4.394 **
1.504 0.748 2.006 1.630 1.658 0.755
Conc_immi -7.381 ** -9.192 ** -6.229 ** -8.710 ** -7.183 ** -12.666 **
1.286 0.618 1.824 1.495 1.718 0.692
EC-12 0.024  0.217 ** -0.286 ** -0.259 ** 0.105  0.144 **
0.133 0.059 0.136 0.131 0.120 0.055
Ex-Yugoslavia -0.770 ** -0.114  -0.509 * -0.904 ** -0.377 * 0.222 **
0.245 0.087 0.294 0.350 0.229 0.081
ODC 0.174  0.217 ** -0.094  0.028  0.357 ** 0.071  
0.133 0.069 0.168 0.144 0.155 0.068
Turkey 0.000  0.103  -0.703 ** 0.412 ** 0.361 * 1.000 **
0.157 0.070 0.217 0.170 0.185 0.074
Pakistan 0.596 ** 0.241 ** -0.164  0.499 ** 1.057 ** 0.982 **
0.151 0.077 0.205 0.162 0.210 0.083
Vietnam -0.009  0.059  -1.818 ** -0.254  0.211  0.458 **
0.227 0.123 0.574 0.292 0.421 0.148
Iran 0.618 ** 0.136  -0.875 ** -0.329  0.850 ** 0.548 **
0.140 0.090 0.320 0.210 0.280 0.121
No-state 0.341 ** -0.394 ** -1.238 ** 0.015  1.233 ** 0.715 **
0.162 0.113 0.509 0.261 0.442 0.175
OLDC 0.059  0.293 ** -0.206  0.436 ** 0.159  0.511 **
0.125 0.059 0.158 0.138 0.143 0.060
Education   3.271 ** 1.658 ** 1.943 ** -0.299  0.083  -2.838 **
0.647 0.348 0.877 0.751 0.819 0.359
Experience   -6.302 ** 0.603 * 5.441 ** -0.976  -4.955 ** -6.365 **
0.829 0.364 0.935 0.807 0.789 0.371
Years_U_in DK -3.854 ** -5.192 ** -4.312 ** -1.003  1.289  4.392 **
1.106 0.551 1.400 1.181 1.405 0.581
Single  -0.376 ** -0.050  0.114  0.176 * 0.026  0.181 **
0.091 0.043 0.129 0.094 0.112 0.044
Age_migration -5.557 ** -3.628 ** -1.598 * 1.305 * -2.478 ** 2.381 **
0.704 0.339 0.963 0.778 0.789 0.342
Refugee  -0.040  0.047  -0.037  0.129  -0.620 ** -0.336 **
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0.118 0.055 0.182 0.146 0.167 0.062
DK citizen 0.130 * -0.066 * -0.059  -0.008  0.002  -0.164 **
0.078 0.039 0.102 0.082 0.093 0.040
DK partner 0.007  0.238 ** 0.305 ** -0.080  -0.056  -0.383 **
0.091 0.045 0.109 0.095 0.101 0.044
Child 0-2 0.025  0.010  -0.143  0.079  0.057  0.000  
0.087 0.047 0.136 0.100 0.111 0.049
Child 3-9 0.127 * 0.041  -0.085  -0.292 ** 0.057  -0.066 *
0.073 0.037 0.097 0.084 0.086 0.038
Child 10-17 0.159 ** 0.045  -0.092  -0.238 ** 0.013  -0.068 *
0.072 0.037 0.093 0.079 0.082 0.036
Big city 0.298 ** 0.335 ** 0.269 ** 0.344 ** 0.353 ** 0.517 **
0.086 0.042 0.122 0.099 0.107 0.044
Prop. Owner 0.458 ** -0.035  0.138  -0.459 ** 0.363 ** -0.546 **
0.090 0.045 0.098 0.090 0.088 0.041
PSS11 0.730 **
0.090
PSS12 0.630 **
0.090
PSS21 1.535 ** 1.075 **
0.238 0.173
PSS22 1.003 ** 0.118  
0.218 0.155
UIB11 -0.182  0.244 **
0.131 0.058
UIB12 -0.491 ** 0.017  
0.077 0.037
UIB21 -0.204  -0.659 **
0.159 0.070
UIB22 0.052  -0.987 **
0.111 0.051
UIB23 -0.173 * -1.268 **
0.095 0.039
"&!#.
1 0 -2.005 ** -3.011 **
0 0.204 0.158
2 0 -1.194 ** 1.405 **
0 0.293 0.078
12 0 0.513 * 0.380 **
0 0.358 0.067
10 0 0.223 0.529 **
0 0.357 0.071
02 0 0.143 0.014
0 0.159 0.018
00 0 0.121 0.077 **
0 0.155 0.028
N 42696 13700 62442
L(full) -19514.9 -6704.1 -23018.8
L(const) -21782.0 -7129.9 -25395.2
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.060 0.094
Note: ** indicates significance at a 5% level and * indicates significance at a 10% level. L(const) is the likelihood value from an
estimation including a constant term only  and a correcteion for unobserved heterogeneity. The Pseudo R2 is calculated as: 
Pesudo R2=1-(L(full)/L(const)).
 In some estimations, the full parametrization of the unobserved could not be identified. In that case, some of the parameters  and 
 are restricted to 0 to achieve identification.
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